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International
Greenhouse Gas
Offsets Under the
Clean Air Act
by Nathan Richardson
Nathan Richardson is a Visiting Scholar at
Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.

Editors’ Summary
Offsets, and in particular international offsets, have
been advanced as an important tool in climate policy,
capable of significantly reducing the costs of emissions
reductions. As attention turns to the existing CAA as a
potential vehicle for general reduction of GHG emissions, an important question is whether regulation
under the statute is compatible with international offsets. Certain regulatory programs under the CAA are
likely candidates for GHG regulation, but many of
them are legally incompatible with international offsets.
Those programs that might permit use of international
offsets have other problems that make them unpopular
choices for GHG regulation. To the extent that CAA
regulation depends on state action, state law and constitutional limitations appear to offer more barriers than
opportunities for use of international offsets. These conclusions have implications for the costs and flexibility of
climate policy under the CAA.

W

ith the U.S. Congress’ failure to date to create
comprehensive climate legislation, attention has
turned to moves by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs)
under the existing Clean Air Act (CAA).1 Among the many
questions raised by this shift are whether and how policy
instruments such as emissions trading and offsets can be
incorporated into CAA regulation. This Article will briefly
analyze whether that statute provides any plausible basis for
use of international GHG offsets for stationary sources.2 The
foundation for almost all of the analysis presented here is the
CAA itself—no federal court rulings and very few scholarly
analyses have addressed this question.
The Article briefly discusses offsets as a policy mechanism
and the history of their use within the CAA, before detailing the potential for incorporation of offsets into various
CAA programs that might plausibly be used for regulation
of GHGs.
For various reasons discussed in detail below, none of these
programs seems readily compatible with use of international
offsets in the GHG context. Those programs that might be
compatible are a poor fit for GHG regulation generally. Programs that are better candidates for GHG regulation contain
statutory restrictions that require, at best, creative and legally
questionable reinterpretation in order to be compatible with
international offsets. State-level regulation under the CAA
faces similar challenges and restrictions along with additional barriers that may exist in state law.

I.

Offsets and the CAA

A.

Offsets as a Policy Mechanism

Offsets are an environmental policy mechanism in which
an emitter of a pollutant may increase emissions or avoid
required reductions in emissions by committing to reductions in emissions elsewhere. This commitment—the offset—may come from the same facility, a different facility
under the same owner, or as a result of a contractual agreement between different emitters. The general result of offset
use is that emissions in the relevant area are at least no greater
than before their use, but that trade offs are possible between
various emitting activities and facilities. Relative to a ban on
any emissions increases or individually mandated emissions
reductions, offsetting should be able to achieve equivalent
Author’s Note: I thank Richard Morgenstern for asking the question
that inspired this Article, and Art Fraas for helpful comments and
advice. All remaining errors are my own.
1.	
2.	
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42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
That is, electricity-generation plants, industrial facilities, etc. Emissions from
vehicles—mobile sources—are regulated under separate CAA provisions and
are not discussed here.
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environmental results at lower cost since higher value uses of
a limited emissions “resource” can be prioritized.
Offsets have been recognized as a useful policy mechanism for some time, and have been a part of environmental
regulation in the United States for more than 30 years. They
have attracted increased interest recently due to their potentially large role in controlling the costs of GHG emissions
reductions.3 Some industries and countries are able to reduce
GHG emissions more cheaply than others. To the extent that
emissions cuts beyond those mandated by regulations can
be traded as offsets, the global cost of GHG reductions can
be substantially decreased. Though some problems exist with
accurately determining whether reductions are “additional”
(whether they go beyond what would have been achieved
anyway), offsets are generally recognized as a key part of any
international effort to reduce GHG emissions. International
offsets have figured prominently in climate legislation under
consideration in Congress.4 Because this legislation has
stalled, however, attention has partially shifted to potential
regulation of GHGs by EPA under the existing CAA.

B.

Existing Offset Programs Under the CAA

Offsets have been a formal part of EPA regulation at least
since the 1977 Amendments to the CAA. Under the statute,
EPA is charged with setting uniform national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS).5 Areas that fail to meet these
standards are designated as nonattainment areas.6 Such areas
are subject to strict regulation, including an effective ban
on construction of major new facilities or major modifications to existing facilities that emit pollutants for which the
area is above the NAAQS—unless emissions from the new
or modified facility are offset.7 The Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) provisions of the 1977 CAA Amendments allow such facilities to be built only if they install tight
emissions controls (lowest achievable emission rate (LAER))8
and can offset the additional emissions from the new facility with reductions elsewhere.9 These reductions can be from
other facilities within the same firm, or from other firms in
the same nonattainment area.10 Firms that verifiably reduce
emissions beyond what is required by regulation receive emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be traded to firms
that need to offset emissions from a new facility.11 ERCs can
3.	

See, e.g., Daniel S. Hall, Offsets: Incentivizing Reductions While Managing Uncertainty and Ensuring Integrity (Resources for the Future, Issue Brief CPF No.
15, Nov. 2007), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/CPF_17_IssueBrief_15.pdf; see also Energy Info. Admin., Publ’n No. SR/OIAF/200905, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, at ix (2009).
4.	 See House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Summary: American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454), at 2 (June 9, 2009), available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf
(identifying offsets as a major component of the Act).
5.	 42 U.S.C. §7409(a)(1) (2007), ELR Stat. CAA §109(a)(1).
6.	 CAA §107(d)(1)(A)(i).
7.	 CAA §173(a).
8.	 CAA §171(3).
9.	 CAA §173(c).
10. CAA §173(c)(1).
11. U.S. EPA, National Center for Environmental Economics: Offset Program,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/Epalib/incent.nsf/c484aff385a753cd85256c2c00
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generally only be used within the same nonattainment area
they are created.12
These ERCs and the offset program in general have
become important mechanisms in regulation of nonattainment areas for the six pollutants currently regulated under
the NAAQS (tropospheric ozone, nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter [PM2.5 and PM10], and lead). They are,
however, much more limited in scope than those generally
proposed in the GHG context. This is largely a reflection of
the local character of the pollutants traditionally regulated
under the CAA. ERCs—CAA offsets—are not tradable
across the United States or internationally. They also are
only relevant when CAA regulations would otherwise prevent construction of a new emitting facility—they cannot be
used to avoid or mitigate the impact of regulations on emissions from existing facilities. An emitter facing, for example,
a regulatory requirement to install certain control technology under the CAA cannot use an ERC to avoid having to
make that investment.

II.

International Offsets Under the CAA at
the Federal Level

Given this past experience with offsets under the CAA, the
need for offsets to manage the costs of international GHG
regulation, and the increasing likelihood that short-term
GHG regulation in the United States will be accomplished in
large part through the CAA, what avenues are legally plausible for integrating international offsets into CAA GHG
regulation? This section will address three such potential
avenues: the CAA permitting programs (the vehicle for traditional CAA ERCs); New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) under §111 of the CAA; and more speculative programs under CAA §§115 or 615. None of these, however,
seem to provide a solid legal foundation for international
offsets. Any effort to include international offsets in federal
CAA GHG regulation would therefore have to be based on
tenuous and untested legal theories.

A.

Traditional-Style Offsets: Permitting and the
NAAQS

The existing offset program under permitting schemes (PSD
and New Source Review (NSR)) in the CAA would provide
the strongest precedential foundation for a GHG offset program. Unfortunately, there appears to be no legal basis for
an internationalization of this program. ERCs can only be
created when emissions are reduced by a source in a nonattainment area. Reductions in emissions from foreign sources
therefore could never qualify for ERCs—foreign countries
57ce35/1fde15e82ad9cb50852564ec007aa24e!OpenDocument (last visited
June 19, 2010).
12. CAA §173(c)(1). The only exception is where another nonattainment area has
equal or higher levels of the relevant pollutant and emissions from that other
area contribute to the nonattainment status of the area where the ERC was
created. For the primarily local pollutants regulated under the NAAQS, this in
practice means that ERCs can only be used where they are created or in nearby
or upwind areas.
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cannot be out of attainment with respect to U.S. national air
quality standards.
There are also significant conceptual and practical problems with regulation of GHGs under the NAAQS (as would
be required for any areas to be in nonattainment and therefore eligible for use of ERC offsets). Few who have studied
CAA GHG regulation favor a NAAQS approach. Among
the largest of these conceptual problems is that the globally
uniform nature of GHG pollution would require the entire
United States to be either in attainment or nonattainment,
and that, as a result, different rules for attainment and nonattainment areas would have little meaning.
If GHGs were regulated under the NAAQS and the standard set at a level placing the entire United States in nonattainment, some nationwide offsetting would be possible.
Emissions of GHGs from any area would affect compliance
with the NAAQS everywhere else in the country due to
atmospheric mixing of GHGs, and any additional reductions
in GHG emissions would therefore qualify for ERCs that
could be used anywhere in the country. Although this would
undoubtedly be useful, it does nothing to allow the use of
international offsets. As mentioned above, areas outside the
United States cannot be in nonattainment, even if their
emissions contribute to U.S. concentrations. In this respect,
the CAA is designed to deal with local or at most national
pollution problems—not global pollutants like GHGs.
If GHGs were not regulated under the NAAQS, or the
NAAQS set at a level that put the entire United States in
attainment, permitting requirements would still exist but be
subject to a different standard. All stationary sources that
emit pollutants regulated under the CAA are subject to NSR
when they are initially built or undergo major modification.13 Outside of nonattainment areas, this permit requires
the use of best available control technology (BACT).14 EPA is
charged with determining whether a facility seeking a permit
has implemented BACT. This determination is case-by-case,
but is guided by a “clearinghouse” set up by EPA to provide information on technologies that meet BACT and other
standards required in the CAA.15
Could EPA define BACT so as to include international
offsets? If so, no NAAQS regulation would be necessary (at
least for offsets to be brought into CAA regulation). Unfortunately, the answer seems to be no. BACT is defined in the
CAA as:
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree
of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under
this chapter emitted from or which results from any major
emitting facility, which the permitting authority . . . determines is achievable for such facility through application of
production processes and available methods, systems, and
techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treat-

13. CAA §165(a).
14. CAA §165(a)(4).
15. U.S. EPA, RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse (RBLC), http://cfpub.epa.
gov/RBLC/ (last visited June 20, 2010).
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ment or innovate fuel combustion techniques for control of
each pollutant.16

There are two ways in which this definition appears to
block incorporation of offsets into BACT. First, the language
strongly implies that BACT is a purely technological standard. References to “processes . . . methods, systems, and
techniques” and the specific examples given (such as “fuel
cleaning”) indicate that technology, not trading or offsetting,
is to be the basis of BACT. One might argue that offsets are
a “method” or a “system” of controlling emissions, but this
may stretch the meaning of these terms beyond their breaking point in the context of the statute.
A larger problem for offsets is the apparent requirement
that BACT must control emissions from the facility seeking a permit. BACT is defined as being based on reductions in emissions of pollutants “emitted from . . . any major
facility” that EPA determines is “achievable for such facility.” Reductions in emissions at other facilities appear to be
explicitly excluded.
One possible way to escape this requirement stems from
the fact that BACT is not a specific requirement that a given
technology or “method” be implemented, but a standard
based on the emissions reductions that identified technologies make possible. Even if offsets cannot be considered when
BACT is set, therefore, it might be possible for them to be
considered in determining whether BACT is met. There is
no apparent precedent for this, however. If it were legal, one
would expect domestic offsetting programs under BACT for
pollutants already regulated under the CAA, and no such
programs exist.
Finally, even if international offsets could be used to fulfill
NSR requirements, new and modified facilities would still
face requirements under CAA NSPS. For reasons discussed
in the next section, it appears unlikely that offsets could be
used under NSPS regulation. NSR offsets might therefore
have limited value, even if they could be legally implemented.

B.

Offsets Under CAA Performance Standards

Given the problems mentioned above with regulation of
GHGs under the NAAQS program, most (but not all) who
have studied the issue appear to favor regulating GHGs under
the NSPS. NSPS GHG regulation is explicitly funded under
President Barack Obama’s proposed fiscal year 2011 budget.17
Under the NSPS, EPA is charged with dividing emitters into
“source categories” and creating performance standards for
new and modified sources within the category.18 The Agency
is further charged under §111(d) of the CAA with creation
of guidelines under which states implement performance
standards for existing sources.19 The remainder of this section
16. CAA §169(3).
17. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2011, at 126 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/environmental.pdf (stating: “The Budget also
requests $7 million to develop New Source Performance Standards to control
GHG emissions from a few categories of major stationary sources.”).
18. CAA §111.
19. CAA §111(d).
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discusses the permissibility of international offsets within
federal NSPS regulation—offsets under state regulation of
existing sources will be discussed below.
Traditionally, the NSPS have been technological standards, requiring emissions sources to implement “adequately
demonstrated” technologies or take other measures to
achieve an equivalent reduction in emissions.20 This would
superficially appear to rule out offsets or indeed any marketbased approach under the NSPS—the standards appear to
be traditional command-and-control regulation. This view
may not be entirely accurate, however. The CAA defines
“standard of performance” as “a standard for emissions of
air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction . . . which the Administrator determines
has been adequately demonstrated.”21 Might “best system of
emission reduction” be interpreted to mean, for example, an
emissions trading system or offsets?
There is precedent for this understanding of the definition.
At least one emissions trading system, for waste incinerators,
has been implemented under the NSPS.22 EPA also planned
to create a trading scheme for mercury emissions in its Clean
Air Mercury Rule.23 That rule was struck down by courts on
other grounds.24 EPA therefore believes that emissions trading is permissible under the NSPS despite the foundations of
the program in technology standards. If the statutory language is flexible enough to permit this interpretation, would
it also allow inclusion of a system for international offsets?
This is an untested legal question, but the best answer
appears to be “maybe, but probably not.” At minimum,
implementing an international offset program through NSPS
regulation is legally risky. Looking beyond the relatively
ambiguous “best system of emission reduction” language in
the definition, other language in §111 more clearly indicates
that the NSPS are intended to be technologically driven.
The section refers repeatedly to “technological system[s] of
emissions reduction” as the basis of NSPS standards, a term
clearly defined in the statute as (not surprisingly) a technological standard—examples given in the statute are “precombustion cleaning or treatment of fuels” and the like.25 This
language, combined with the traditional implementation of
NSPS standards in technological terms, make exploitation of
the ambiguity in the best system of emission reduction definition to allow for implementation of nontechnological control methods such as offsets legally difficult. Complicating
the issue further, “standard of performance” is given a different definition elsewhere in the CAA that does not include
20. CAA §111(a)(1).
21. Id.
22. See 40 C.F.R. §60.33b(d)(2) (2009) (stating: “A State plan may establish a
program to allow owners or operators of municipal waste combustor plants to
engage in trading of nitrogen oxides emission credits. A trading program must
be approved by EPA before implementation.”).
23. See U.S. EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule: Basic Information, http://www.epa.
gov/mercuryrule/basic.htm (last visited June. 20, 2010) (stating: “The Clean
Air Mercury Rule established a cap-and-trade system for mercury that is based
on EPA’s proven Acid Rain Program.”).
24. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578, 38 ELR 20046 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
25. CAA §111(a)(7).

9-2010

the ambiguous best system of emission reduction language
(though it does not explicitly require technological standards
either).26 Courts are therefore likely to carefully scrutinize
EPA attempts to broadly interpret §111.27
To some extent, this argument against offsets being permissible under NSPS regulation proves too much—if taken
to its logical conclusion, a narrow reading of the definition
of “standard of performance” forbids not only the use of
offsets but of emissions trading programs (of which at least
one example exists). This existence of regulatory (though not
legal) precedent is helpful to future efforts to create emissions
trading programs under NSPS regulation; however, there is
no such precedent for offsets, though trading and offsets are
conceptually similar in many respects.28 International offsets
present a further problem in that international emissions
sources are not mentioned at all in §111—there is similarly
no precedent for any consideration of international emissions in NSPS programs. While the legal issues are complex
and impossible to predict with certainty, it appears unlikely
that an EPA effort to incorporate international offsets into
NSPS GHG regulation would survive challenge in court. It
cannot be ruled out, however, and at least stands a chance
of being permissible.

C.

Offsets Under More Speculative CAA Programs

Some have proposed regulating GHGs under rarely used
sections of the CAA that, due to their brevity, may provide EPA with greater regulatory discretion. The two CAA
sections most often proposed are §115, 29 governing international emissions, and §615,30 part of the CAA’s Title
VI provisions aimed at pollutants that damage the ozone
layer. The chief attraction of regulating GHGs under
these provisions, as opposed to the much more detailed
provisions governing CAA programs like the NSPS and
26. CAA §302(l).
27. This is a complicated issue of statutory interpretation and results are difficult
to predict. For more analysis of interpretations of the relevant language in the
related context of whether emissions trading is permitted under the NSPS, see
Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act:
Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway (Resources for the
Future, RFF Discussion Paper No. 10-23, 2010). See also Inimai M. Chettiar
& Jason A. Schwartz, Inst. for Policy Integrity, The Road Ahead: EPA’s
Options and Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases (2009),
available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/TheRoadAhead.pdf.
28. As discussed in the text, there appears to be no case law indicating whether the
statutory language of the CAA permits NSPS regulation with emissions trading. There is nevertheless practical precedent for the practice, created by the
program for waste incinerators discussed above (see note 22 and accompanying
text). While the Clean Air Mercury Rule was invalidated by the U.S Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on other grounds (see supra
notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text) and therefore did not create an actual
regulatory program, the Agency’s inclusion of trading mechanisms under the
NSPS indicates, at least, that it believes they are within the latitude granted by
the statute. Use of offsets under the NSPS also has no precedent in case law,
but in contrast to emissions trading, has no apparent precedent in either actual
regulatory programs or proposed rules.
29. See Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep., Mar. 9, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.sidley.com/files/Publication/c789bb2a-7562-4149-8474036f21dee348/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3a6fe43a-22d1-47159f69-04c17efdbd00/GreenhouseGases.pdf.
30. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44354, 44519 (proposed July 30, 2008).
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NAAQS that are actually in use, is the fact that they have
almost none of the restrictions, definitions, and requirements
that limit EPA discretion.
Using §115 or §615 as the primary vehicle for GHG
regulation under the CAA might allow EPA to incorporate
international offsets into GHG regulation—there is little in
these CAA provisions to prevent it. The problem with general
regulation under these provisions is that it is legally untested
and likely to be viewed by courts with skepticism. As I have
written elsewhere, such sweeping regulation under §115 (or
§615) may not be legal.31 Courts usually disfavor attempts
by agencies to use short, vague statutory language to justify
sweeping regulatory changes. As Justice Antonin Scalia has
put it: “Congress does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”32
Such broad regulation of GHG emissions under §115 (indeed,
any GHG regulation under the CAA) is highly likely to be
challenged in the courts. The same brevity in the section that
grants EPA the desired regulatory flexibility will be a weak
point, likely a fatal one, in such a challenge. In other words,
the same lack of specificity that allows EPA to include offset provisions in regulation under these sections makes such
regulation legally questionable.
A different but related approach would be to regulate
GHGs primarily under more established sections of the
CAA, such as §110 (NAAQS) or §111 (NSPS), but to use
§115 as a vehicle for international aspects of GHG regulation, potentially including offsets. Section 115 allows EPA
broad discretion to instruct states to regulate emissions when
domestic regulation is insufficient to prevent harm to foreign
countries.33 EPA might therefore conclude that, even after
domestic GHG regulation under §110 or §111, other countries are still at risk and use §115 to impose additional regulatory requirements on states. The lack of specificity in §115
discussed above might allow EPA to include international
offsets in any such scheme.
This approach is more legally plausible than general GHG
regulation under §115. First, the scale of regulation under
§115 is smaller. EPA would not be attempting to create an
economywide GHG regulatory program under a four-paragraph, never-used section of the statute, but rather using that
section as the basis for one or a few components of a larger
program justified elsewhere in the statute. Second, those
parts of the program that did fall under §115 would seem
to fit better with the stated subject of that section—international air pollution.
Significant problems would remain, however, that make
this approach legally suspect. First, there is some tension
between the language of §115 and offsets themselves. Section 115 is aimed at reductions in “pollutants emitted in
the United States [that] cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country.”34 Offsets generally
31. See Richardson et al., supra note 27.
32. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512
(2001).
33. CAA §115(b). The foreign country must also grant the United States reciprocal rights.
34. CAA §115(a).
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would have the opposite effect—they would allow states to
export emissions (and, therefore, endangerment) to foreign
countries. This is less true for GHGs since they are uniformly
distributed globally—to the extent that offsets would result
in lower global emissions, foreign countries would benefit
just as much as the state in which the offset is used. Still,
offsets would not result in any reduction in “pollutants emitted in the United States” and therefore seem at odds with the
plain language of §115.35
The second problem is that courts may view an international offset program as an “elephant in a mousehole” just as
they likely would a general GHG regulatory program. The
former is smaller and less complex, to be sure, but is still
likely to involve substantial new regulation and creation of
a large international offset market. Section 115 may not provide sufficient legal basis on which to ground such a regulatory scheme.
The chief advantage of regulating GHGs primarily under
well-tested provisions of the CAA and restricting the use of
§115 to offsets is not, therefore, that the legal foundation for
use of offsets or use of §115 for any GHG regulation are significantly stronger, but that these questions can be separated
from the broader GHG regulatory scheme. If a court rules
that §115 cannot be used in this way, the remainder of the
GHG regulatory scheme can stand alone—though it would
be more expensive.

III. Offsets as State-Level CAA Regulation
The previous sections have dealt with federal regulation
under the CAA. CAA programs and enforcement are not
restricted to EPA or the federal government generally, however. The largest programs within the CAA for stationary
source regulation, the NSPS and NAAQS, have substantial
state-level components, and the CAA is generally viewed as
an exercise in “cooperative federalism.” State governments
do not face many of the restrictions placed on EPA by the
CAA and separation-of-powers doctrines, and have substantial flexibility to implement policies to meet (or exceed)
CAA requirements. It is therefore worth exploring whether
states operating under the NAAQS or NSPS would be able
to include international offsets in their component of CAA
GHG regulation.

A.

State Regulation Under the NAAQS

Under the NAAQS, states are responsible for creating state
implementation plans (SIPs) that detail how state regulatory efforts will result in air quality that meets or exceeds
the national standards. EPA must evaluate these plans and
may approve or reject them—only if an SIP is rejected can
EPA directly implement regulation through a federal implementation plan (FIP). The Agency can also make “SIP calls”
in which it requests revisions of existing SIPs. EPA can make
35. This would not necessarily be an issue with a GHG regulatory scheme entirely
under §115 authority, as such a scheme would presumably result in reductions
in U.S. emissions, even if §115’s flexibility allowed offsets to be included.
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recommendations and retains final approval authority over
SIPs, but cannot dictate the regulatory policies that states
implement beyond determining whether they fulfill the
requirements of the CAA. This process has in the past been
a vehicle for integration of emissions trading schemes into
NAAQS regulation, with EPA issuing a “model” set of regulations that states may then implement in their SIPs.36 The
practical result is a full emissions trading program under
the NAAQS, but it is states, not EPA, that actually implement the program. EPA could only directly implement a
NAAQS program if it rejects states’ SIPs and instead implements an FIP.37
In principle, it would likely be possible for EPA to include
international offsets in a model rule for states. Section 110(a)
(2)(A) of the CAA lists regulatory mechanisms that states
can use in their SIPs: “Enforceable emissions limitations
and other control measures, means, or techniques (including economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits,
and auctions of emissions rights).”38 This language appears
to be sufficiently broad to encompass offsets. Offsets could
easily be characterized as a “control measure[ ], means, or
technique[ ]”, and the mention of “economic incentives”
seems to indicate that Congress intended to give broad flexibility to the states. On the other hand, some such economic
incentives are mentioned, while offsets are not. The list is not
exclusive, however. Certainly it is much easier to fit offsets
into this statutory language than it is to characterize them as
“performance standards” under the NSPS.
If EPA did explicitly include offsets in a model SIP (and,
in principle, even if it did not), states could then choose
whether to include offset provisions in their SIPs. If offsets
were part of a model rule, states would know that if they followed the model (including use of offsets), their SIPs would
be approved. A problem with past use of market mechanisms
in the SIP process has been the inability of EPA to guarantee that emissions in a given state would cause significant
air pollution in another state, as courts have held is required
by the CAA.39 This would likely not be an issue with offsets
(international or otherwise) in the GHG context, however.
Because GHGs are globally dispersed pollutants, any reduction in emissions anywhere should have the same effect on
ambient GHG levels.
While legally plausible up to this point, this approach
suffers from the same problems discussed in Section II.A.
with respect to GHG regulation under the NAAQS—the
program is not a good fit for the GHG problem, and the fact
that states have some flexibility does not change that very
36. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Clean Air Markets: NOx Budget Trading Program—Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/nox/sipbasic.html
(stating that, under this program, “[c]ap and trade programs set a cap on overall regional emissions and allocate each affected source allowances authorizing
a certain number of tons of emissions”).
37. One scholar has proposed that EPA attempt to resolve some of the issues with
a GHG NAAQS by rejecting all SIPs and implementing a single, nationwide
FIP. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1967 (2007).
38. CAA §110(a)(2)(A).
39. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908, 38 ELR 20306a (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(per curiam).
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much. Just because states may be able to implement offsets or
emissions trading does not solve larger problems such as the
level at which a GHG NAAQS should be set or the futility
of states being forced to plan to meet a standard for a global
pollutant over which they have little individual control. As
discussed in Section III.C. below, implementation of offsets
through state regulation also may create more legal problems,
some of them constitutional, than it resolves.

B.

State Regulation Under the NSPS

As mentioned in Section II.B. above, EPA is charged under
the CAA with regulation of new and modified stationary
sources in the NSPS program, while states are charged with
regulation of existing sources under §111(d). Regulation
under §111(d) only comes into play if a pollutant is not regulated under the NAAQS or certain other CAA provisions.40
Assuming this is the case, §111(d) regulation is similar in
many ways to the NAAQS process: EPA creates “guidelines”
for existing source performance standards, and states must
create a plan for implementation of these standards. The
Agency then approves or rejects the state plan.
Because of the way in which §111(d) is written, however,
it does not grant states the same degree of regulatory flexibility as the NAAQS/SIP process does. States are required by
this section to regulate through “standards of performance,”
the same general method—defined in the statute—as EPA
is directed to use.41 The ambiguity of this term’s definition
under the CAA is discussed in Section II.B. above, and the
same analysis would apply to state regulation. As a result,
prospects for integration of international offsets into statedriven §111(d) regulation of existing sources seem no greater
than those for such integration into NSPS programs generally.

C.

Other Issues Surrounding State Regulation

While their quasi-sovereign status and the significant delegations of authority within CAA programs grant states greater
regulatory flexibility, one must be careful not to ignore the
restrictions that state law places on this flexibility. While
states taken as a whole have great regulatory discretion, the
same is true of the federal government. States only appear to
have more discretion when compared to a single branch of
the federal government or, as has been done in the sections
above, with a single federal agency—EPA. In reality, SIPs,
§111(d) performance standards, and other air pollution regulation by states must be approved by state legislatures or state
agencies with sufficient authority delegated to them. Implementing a given regulatory scheme, such as international offsets, faces similar legal and ultimately political challenges at
the state level as it does at the federal level. Analysis of the
legality of international offsets under state law is beyond the
scope of this Article, but will ultimately be highly relevant
if state regulation is to be the vehicle for integrating these
offsets into larger CAA regulation.
40. CAA §111(d)(1)(A).
41. Id.
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States also have the power to go beyond federal environmental regulation, as illustrated in the GHG context by California’s AB 32 measures42 and regional initiatives such as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).43 In principle,
states acting alone or in groups could implement GHG regulation that includes provisions for international offsets. This
is true regardless of the form and content of federal CAA
regulation of GHGs, or even in the absence of any federal
regulation. Analysis of this possibility is similarly beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is nevertheless relevant and legally
(if not necessarily politically or practically) realistic.
There is some potential that state regulations that incorporate international offsets, whether under delegated CAA
authority or independent state authority, could be deemed
to impermissibly interfere with the executive branch foreign
affairs powers under the U.S. Constitution. How this issue
would play out would depend on the specific facts of the dispute. States would be less likely to encounter constitutional
problems if offsets can be characterized as contracts between
private-party emitters, rather than as a treaty-like arrangement between a state and a foreign country. In general, however, this issue might never come before a court, as standing
issues could present a significant barrier.44

IV.

Conclusions

There appears to be no solid legal foundation for incorporation of international offsets in CAA GHG regulation. Offsets might be brought in through state-level CAA regulation.
Because §110(a)(2)(A) is the only CAA provision sufficiently
broad to grant states the regulatory authority to incorporate
offsets, the only offset-compatible CAA pathway open to
EPA would be the NAAQS. This pathway is generally perceived as a poor fit for the GHG problem. Bringing in offsets
through the more GHG-friendly NSPS program at either
the federal or state (using §111(d)) level requires creative
interpretation of CAA language (specifically, whether offsets are “standards of performance”) that may not hold up
in court. State efforts to integrate international offsets under
delegated CAA authority also require authorization under
state law, and may be subject to challenge on constitutional
grounds. Other CAA programs, such as §115, might allow
EPA to implement offset programs without state involvement, but regulation of GHGs under these programs at all
is legally suspect.

42. See California Air Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (stating that, among
other mandates, the California Air Resources Board “shall prepare and approve
a scoping plan for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and costeffective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of
sources of greenhouse gases by 2020”).
43. See RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.
pdf.
44. This question—whether unilateral state action to permit international offsets
interferes with the executive foreign affairs power—is complex, and a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.

40 ELR 10893

As a result, it appears that new federal or at least state
legislation is required to incorporate international offsets into
U.S. GHG regulation. Use of offsets—and the cost savings
they would likely bring—should therefore be considered a
major advantage of comprehensive climate legislation over
the CAA tools currently available to EPA.

